LORD ODO RUSSELL

clearer. He had to reckon with the Emperor's preference for his
nephew and was disappointed to find that public opinion, too,
was far more Russian than Hungarian.1

This summary of Bismarck's attitude made no great impres-
sion on the Foreign Office. Lord Tenterden was quite unable
to understand it, unless it meant that Russell was "really in the
dark as to Prince Bismarck's intentions and policy." Lord
Derby wished Lord Odo to be informed that Sir Henry's
instructions were not communicated to any government except
Germany, who could only have heard of it after it had been acted
upon. He emphasized England's earnest desire to work with
Germany, and thought she could do a great deal to help towards
the preservation of peace if she could prevail upon Russia to
accept the armistice. As Bismarck, however, appeared to be
opposed to the idea of a conference, he would like to know "what
other plan for procuring an agreement between the Powers he
would consider favourably."2 Despite these douches of cold
water, Lord4Odo Russell's eyes seem to have seen more accur-
ately than Lord Tenterden's or Lord Derby's. Bismarck's
dilemma was real, and moreover, the touchiness he felt against
Great Britain, and his disappointment was destined to grow and
bear bitter fruit when the time became ripe for Germany to
develop a colonial policy which for the first time brought her
interests into direct conflict with those of England.

On 12 October Turkey accepted the armistice, with the stipu-
lation that it must last six months. The Powers immediately
grouped themselves into opposite camps; Austria, Great
Britain and France agreed with the Turkish stipulation, while
Russia and Serbia declared themselves opposed to it on the
ground that so long an armistice unduly favoured Turkey as
Serbia could not afford to keep her army so long on a war
footing.3

Bismarck was looking at the situation from his accustomed
point of view. ". . . The more difficult the crisis, the more
circumspectly must we, as I think, conduct ourselves and express
in our diplomacy that our interests do not lie in this or that
shaping of the relations of the Turkish Empire, but in the position

llbid. 441. To Lord Derby. Secret, n October 1876.
indorsement on previous despatch.
*G.P. II. p.64.